Abstract: Deliberative democracy, as a dominant paradigm in contemporary democratic theory, offers a new, attractive conception of democratic legitimacy, which represents an alternative to a democracy that functions through the mechanism of political competition. A major problem with deliberation is the issue of its institutionalisation, as the theories of deliberative democracy have not produced a more specific institutional framework or form in which it could be used in political practice. Parliaments appear to be particularly suitable places for its potential implementation. Moreover, deliberative democracy could contribute to a change in discourse quality and the way decision-making is conducted in parliaments, which is often considered problematic. Due to its incompatibility with competitive democracy, the opportunities for introducing deliberative democracy into parliaments are very limited. The study also outlines three ways of reconciling deliberative democracy and parliaments.
Introduction
The critical evaluation of the quality of political discourse is a popular theme, both in the academic and the public realm (Bächtinger et al. 2008 ). Considerable attention is being paid to parliaments as the central institutions of today's representative democracy. With their highly polarized environment, low respect, non-consensual decision-making, pursuit of narrow interests of particular groups, parliamentary debates and decision-making are often seen as problematic by both the lay public and experts.
2 HUMAN AFFAIRS 21, 422-436, 2011 DOI: 10.2478 1 This paper was written in conjunction with project No.26240120017 supported by OP R&D (ERDF). 2 A good example of expert criticism is the Global Report on the State of Society published by the Institute for Public Affairs, which is a generally respected source of information on political and social development in Slovakia. Grigorij Mesežnikov's evaluation of the functioning of parliament and the level of parliamentary debate is highly critical. He points out the adversarial relationships between coalition and opposition and the application of the tyranny of majority through the rejection of all legislative proposals submitted by opposition MPs and in the selective rejection of opposition MP's attempts to assert the controlling function of parliament (Mesežnikov 2009, 26) . Besides, the report also pays attention to other aspects of adversarial relationships in the parliament. According to the
The current situation in democratic parliaments raises several questions. For instance, is it a pathological part of democratic parliaments, or a standard element in the functioning of democracy? Is it possible to change the relationships within the parliaments?
To answer these questions it is necessary to examine more thoroughly the mechanisms of the functioning of parliamentary relationships and the fulfilment of democratic ideals in modern representative democracy based on the concept of political competition.
This also brings us to deliberative democracy, a major concept in democratic theory (Elster 1998; Carter and Stokes 2002; McGann 2006; Besson and Martí 2006; Bächtinger and Pedrini 2010) . Since deliberative theorists believe that deliberative processes will improve democratic practice and the quality of public policy (Mansbridge 1999) and that they could solve democratic deficits in representative democracy (Warren and Pearse 2008) , deliberative democracy should also have the potential to solve the aforementioned problems and offer a new perspective on the objectives of democracy and the way it works. Moreover, the values brought by the conception of deliberative democracy seem to be the opposite of the current state.
My main objective is to examine the possibilities of applying the elements of deliberative democracy generally in parliaments, which might serve as an appropriate place for its implementation. First and foremost, I will try to evaluate the current position of deliberative democracy and its influence on the functioning of parliaments. The analysis should answer the question as to whether the attempt to introduce deliberative democracy and its elements into parliaments is appropriate and meaningful.
Deliberative democracy
The past few years have seen a remarkable excitement in the theory of democracy. In the early 1990s the normative conception of democracy took a strong deliberative turn (Dryzek 2000) , which argued that the essence of democratic legitimacy is to be found in authentic deliberations on the part of those affected by a collective decision.
Deliberative democracy is based mainly on the rejection of the aggregative conception of democracy that takes the preferences of individuals as given, and requires no justification for the preferences themselves, but seeks only to combine them in various ways that are efficient and fair (Gutmann and Thompson 2004) . According to the aggregative conception of democracy, the final collective decision should give equal consideration to the interests of all people affected by the decision. Based on the democratic rule that people are the best judges of their own interests, individual interests and preferences are considered equally valuable regardless of their content. From the perspective of deliberative democracy, the final collective decision should not only give consideration to the interests of all people report, the representatives of the ruling coalition questioned the legitimacy of any opinion that was not based on majority support regardless of its accuracy and validity. Apart from denying the legitimacy of these opinions, the representatives of the ruling coalition tried to question the professional and personal integrity of the holders of these opinions. These practices not only reduce the quality of democracy in Slovakia but also put into question compliance with the principles of democracy in general (Mesežnikov 2009). affected by the decision but also to stand the test of intersubjective justification. Therefore the democratic processes should take into account only those interests that prove to be reasonable and meaningful in the process of mutual justification (Hayward 2009 ). Thus the emphasis is put on the process of the collective consideration of individual interests and preferences and equal access to the process. One of the primary aims of deliberative democracy is to transform rather than aggregate preferences, which means that the common good is manufactured rather than discovered (Saward 2000; van Mill 2006) .
The aforementioned sources and starting points of deliberative democracy shape the more specific form of democratic deliberation, which, at least ideally, should include several basic characteristics. Steiner at al. (2004) defined six central aspects of the ideal type of deliberative democracy.
A first characteristic of deliberative democracy is participation by all citizens at an equal level and without constraints in publicly open political processes. More specifically, this means that no one with the competency to speak and act may be excluded from the discourse. All have the same opportunities to question and to introduce any assertion and to express their attitudes, desires and needs (Steiner et al. 2004, 19) . This characteristic represents a democratic element of deliberative democracy (Elster 1998) and should meet the requirements of political equality and popular sovereignty, which are the central requirements of democracy. What makes deliberative democracy democratic is an expansive definition of who is included in the process of deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson 2004) .
The other five characteristics, which can be called the "deliberative part" of deliberative democracy, show the difference between deliberation and other types of communicative interactions. The ideal type of deliberative democracy requires all participants to express their arguments in a truthful way, which means that they reveal their true values; they truly believe in these values and do not utter them merely for tactical reasons in order to strengthen their argument. Other characteristics of the ideal type of deliberative democracy require logical justification and authentic respect toward the arguments of others. An important characteristic, which distinguishes democratic deliberation from other conceptions, is that the merits of the arguments should be expressed in terms of the common good. That is, there should be a sense of empathy or solidarity that allows the participants to consider the wellbeing of others and of the community at large. This does not mean, however, that self-interest should be excluded as an argument. But someone using it as an argument must demonstrate that his or her self-interest is compatible with the common good or even contributes to the common good (Steiner et al. 2004, 21-22) . The sixth characteristic of the ideal type of deliberative democracy, which can be considered crucial, is that it is open to change. There should be a willingness on the part of all participants to yield to the force of the better argument, which means that the preferences of the participants should not be fixed, but be open to change. The second dimension of openness is its dynamic and provisional feature, since the participants have a chance to reverse or modify the results of deliberation in the future (Gutmann and Thompson 2004) .
Deliberation is supposed to have many positive effects. First of all, it makes it possible to shape and transform the preferences of people with a focus on the common good. Moreover, the common good can only be revealed in discussion (McGann 2006) . The final decisions made through deliberation are supposed to be of a higher quality. While the assessment of different information and perspectives makes the decisions more informed, the rational justification, which reveals logical and factual errors in argumentation and irrational preferences, makes them more meaningful. Instead of the narrow interests of particular groups, decision-making should only give consideration to reasonable arguments based mainly on the universal principles of justice and the common good.
As deliberative democracy takes into account not only the interests and preferences of individuals but also the reasons and arguments given in support of the proposals, their proponents believe it is more sensitive to people as autonomous and rational agents. Therefore, deliberative democracy is more appropriate for respecting and promoting the value of political autonomy than other models based on bargaining or pure voting (Martí 2006) . Another expected advantage of deliberation (at least ideally) is that it leads to consensus (Cohen 1989; Landwehr and Holzinger 2010; van Mill 2006; Martí 2006 ), which appears to be a fairer basis for collective decision-making than voting.
The normative requirement of deliberative democracy that the legitimacy of political decisions in democracy should be based on the deliberation process as a result of discussion among free, equal and rational actors still remains a significant political challenge. This challenge, however, requires theoretical and empirical studies on the conditions of feasibility (Plichtová 2010) , which would require an analysis of the possibilities of the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy.
Institutionalisation of deliberative democracy and the parliament as institution
Deliberative democracy has mainly been a normative theoretical conception of democratic legitimacy, and therefore it does not offer clear and more widely accepted ideas on how it should be institutionalised. The theories of deliberative democracy usually do not offer proposals for a particular institutional framework or form for the implementation of deliberation mainly due to the applicability and effectiveness of deliberation on a macrolevel. The analysis of institutional conditions has long been the weak point of deliberative democracy theories (Warren 2007) . But the situation has changed recently and scholars have begun to explore institutional contexts that favour high quality political discourse (Bächtinger and Pedrini 2010) . Institutions and institutional design have received a great deal of attention in the effort to introduce deliberation into the political practice. The reason for this direction is also the fact that institutions are the kinds of things that can be changed directly, whereas cultures and psychological dispositions are less subject to collective intervention and experimentation (Warren and Pearse 2008) .
Basically it is possible to distinguish two strategies that could lead to the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy. The first strategy assumes that deliberative reforms should take the form of introducing new, deliberative political institutions alongside the existing ones 3 . As these reforms assume substantial institutional change, they require constitutional reform. The obstacles to the implementation of the reform include the depth of the reform and the need for broad support, whether on the level of political elites or the public. Regardless of the motivation of political elites to accept deliberative experiments depriving them of part of their power, there is no immediate obvious urgent need to make democracy more deliberative on the part of the public. Despite attempts at deliberative experiments 4 , deliberative democracy is not sufficiently well-known and popular and the need for it is not strong enough to entice politicians to support large-scale reforms of the political system (Chappell 2007) .
The second possibility for the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy is to strengthen the deliberative elements of existing institutions. The existing institutions contain some elements of deliberation, or the potential for its introduction, so reforming them could bring the desired results without introducing new institutions and transforming the existing political system. Though this way is not so ambitious 5 , it may be more realistic and more easily accepted by both the politicians who must adopt and implement the reforms and the citizens. This approach focuses mainly on parliament. There are numerous reasons why parliaments represent an attractive place for introducing deliberative democracy. First of all, parliament is a forum with a limited number of seats whose role is to discuss political issues and binding regulations, which solves the problem of the extent, time, sources and motivation of deliberation actors. In addition, parliaments are the central institutions of today's democracies with the power to decide on binding social norms. The crucial position and role of parliaments in the political system provide hope to deliberative theorists that achieving higher deliberative qualities in parliament would have significant implications for the deliberative character of the political system as a whole. Apart from constitutional authority, parliaments also have democratic legitimacy derived from democratic elections. Though this democratic legitimacy does not completely meet the ideal type of deliberative democracy, it is widely accepted, unchallenged and makes it possible to approach legislators as the representatives of voters.
The implementation of deliberation in parliaments should be facilitated by the fact that existing procedures for parliamentary work comply with the needs of deliberation. Decision-making in parliament is usually preceded by debates and discussions, whether on the level of the plenum or specialised bodies, which create opportunities for the exchange of arguments, justifications or the submission of alternative proposals. The rules and practice of the functioning typical of parliaments is very close to the conception of deliberative democracy.
The reasons stated above clearly demonstrate why parliaments might be extremely promising places for putting deliberative democracy into practice and simultaneously becoming a space where it is possible to reasonably combine the elements of aggregate democracy and deliberation. This would result in the higher democratic legitimacy of political decision-making.
Deliberation and its use in parliaments 6
Despite the assumptions associated with pointing out the promising potential of parliaments for deliberation, existing empirical studies give us a completely opposing picture of parliamentary debates. Many surveys that use the Discourse Quality Index (DQI 7 ), probably the best empirical operationalization of deliberative democracy, show similar results: parliamentary debates in general are not significantly deliberative in character, not only in terms of the characteristics (e.g. respect towards other participants, respect towards counterarguments, the content of justifications, constructive politics) but also in terms of the transformation of preferences (Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtinger et al. 2008; Bächtinger and Pedrini 2010; Landwehr and Holzinger 2010) .
From the perspective of the proponents of deliberative democracy, the results are not necessarily alarming. Apart from the low deliberative quality of parliamentary debates, they also suggest that institutional factors have an influence on the quality of deliberation. This means that the deliberative qualities of parliamentary debate could be improved by means of appropriate institutions. The appropriate institutional preconditions for deliberation include consensual institutions, the presence of veto players, the presence of a second chamber in parliament and non-public debates. Among the factors weakening deliberation are competition, the absence of veto players, the lack of chamber and public debate. Apart from institutional factors, the quality of deliberation is also affected by the nature of the issues discussed, with polarised issues having the most negative impact on deliberation 8 .
Why are parliaments insufficiently deliberative?
First of all it is necessary to explain why parliaments lack significant deliberative characteristics. The main reason is a fundamental difference between deliberative and competitive democracy that seems to be mutually incompatible. A clear winner in this imaginary conflict is political competition, as it is the mechanism on which today's 6 My assessment and analysis of the deliberative quality of parliaments is based on the nature of public parliamentary debate. This means that the deliberative quality of the parliament is identified with the deliberative quality of parliamentary debate. I am well aware that the parliamentary debate does not have to fully represent the deliberative qualities of the parliament, as the relationships within the parliament go beyond the relationships presented within official parliamentary debate. On the other hand, crucial theoretical characteristics of deliberative democracy (public debate, reasoned debate, inclusiveness, respect) show that they should be present in the context of an official parliamentary debate. I was also limited by the lack of empirical data which are not available beyond the official debates. 7 The Discourse Quality Index (DQI) is a quantitative measure of how far political discourse in legislatures approximates deliberative ideals. The index measures whether legislators were able to state their arguments without interruptions, the level and content of justifications offered, the respect legislators showed towards other groups and other arguments and the extent to which political discourse aimed at building a consensus (for more details see Steebergen et al. 2003; Steiner et al. 2004) . 8 Given that my aim is to analyse the role of institutional factors, I won't deal with this characteristic in more detail. The influence of the form of an issue on deliberation, however, does not comply with Habermas' assumption of issue neutrality (Bächtinger and Pedrini 2010) and points to the limited opportunities for pure rationality and the strength of a better argument. democratic systems are built and its logic is translated into the way the parliaments work. Deliberative characteristics, by contrast, are marginalised, as they minimally contribute to the values and objectives of political competition. Competition is a mechanism that naturally divides and generates many actors with different objectives and interests; otherwise it completely loses its meaning. The actors in a competitive system are motivated to advocate their positions and emphasise their differences as clearly as possible. Such an environment is not conducive to an open discourse, not even in a problem solving situation (Scharpf 1997) . The form and perception of the common good as a basic objective of deliberate democracy disappears. The crucial criterion is the number of votes, not the content and strength of arguments. Party competition does not resemble a democratic debate in which common topics are addressed and examined, but rather a market in which stallholders call out the attractiveness of their wares on offer to the public (Weale 2006) . It provides space for a strategic approach, where the actors calculate mainly the usefulness of their decisions for the pursuit of their interests and the expected impact on the number of votes obtained. Though they need to justify their steps to the voters, the justifications do not require the rationality and logic of arguments. Competition gives no reason to respect the interests of others; the only priority is to pursue one's own interest. As other actors represent political opponents, competition motivates the participants to defeat the opponents' initiatives in order to undermine their reputation for competent and successful political action (Steiner et al. 2001 ).
As we can see political competition significantly reduces the incentives and possibilities for mutual cooperation and a change in preferences. On the other hand, if government parties need other parties to pass legislation, they must build supporting coalitions, and this may involve deliberative action. Due to the difference in participants' interests, however, this form of cooperation differs from cooperation according to the ideal of deliberative democracy. Instead of the deliberation among all the actors involved being characterised by a focus on the common good, rational arguments and transformation of preferences, cooperation takes place in the form of negotiations and lack any significant deliberative qualities. The participants in the negotiations do not pursue the common good, but maximise their own preferences (Landwehr and Holzinger 2010) . Their preferences are not being transformed and do not require justification; they are just subordinated to the common goal. Cooperation in the form of negotiations does not require the involvement of all participants. Attempts to maximise the benefits and the strategic calculations usually lead to a reduction in the number of participants to the minimum required for achieving a common goal. Interests of actors who do not take part in negotiations, or are not part of the final agreement, do not have to be taken into account. This does not mean that cooperation approximating the ideal of deliberative democracy is necessarily totally excluded from the competitive setting. However, it requires a reduction in the actors' incentives to compete, the need for a broad cooperation and agreement as well as the importance of mutual exchange of information or weight of arguments for decision-making. But these conditions only relate to exceptional situations, in particular serious crises or threats to society, which require joint action and widely accepted decisions. Apart from exceptional situations, however, democratic systems, including the parliaments, are dominated by competitive interactions that do not provide significant space for deliberation.
Deliberation in the parliament and institutional characteristics
Different institutional configurations, however, may contribute to higher deliberative qualities in the parliament through reduction of political competition. Therefore it is necessary to examine the various individual options and their results in the light of empirical findings.
From a deliberative perspective, less favourable situations can be expected in institutional settings with strong party competition, namely in parliamentary democracies with simple majority decision-making and parties as crucial actors. Due to political competition, the parliaments become the arenas of the political opponents. The cooperation basically focuses negotiations on the establishment and performance of the government (if necessary), without a more considerable deliberative content. The negotiations divide the parliament into the majority and opposition, where the effect of competition among government parties 9 is reduced by the accentuation of the competition between government and opposition. The government-opposition relationship is very competitive with mutual attempts to demonstrate the rival's impotence and incompetence. Moreover, a cooperative opposition must fear that political achievements will be assigned to the government. Opportunities for cooperation between the government and the opposition or among individual MPs are limited by the direct link between the parliamentary majority and the government. Any possible attempts at deliberative action or modification of government proposals threaten government stability (Bächtinger et al. 2008) . The government's dependence on a parliamentary majority creates strong incentives for strict party discipline along government-opposition lines and the legislators have strong a priori incentives to defend or oppose the proposals of the government, depending on whether their party belongs to the government or the opposition, which means that argumentative lines have been established before the debate (Steiner et al. 2004 ). MPs of government parties cannot be expected to deliberate either. Any potential disagreements are settled within the executive or through the meetings of coalition leaders before the parliamentary debate. As a result, parliamentary debate's only function is to allow government MPs to present their final agreements and the chamber to vote. As any possible deliberative action could threaten government stability, it is excluded from the parliamentary debate.
Moreover, making compromises and behaving cooperatively do not comply with expectations imposed on the elected representative who must present himself/herself as a knowing, competent and moral decision-maker. As the admission of errors and changes in opinion are interpreted as weaknesses and untrustworthiness, legislators try to avoid them (Landwehr 2009 ). In government-opposition settings, changes in preferences are not regarded as deliberative virtues, but climb-downs.
Poor deliberative qualities also appear in the course and structure of parliamentary debate, which can be characterised more as a sequence of monologues than a dialogue. Individual groups are pre-defined along party and government-opposition lines. The arguments are presented, not exchanged. MPs of government parties use the debating time to argue in favour of decisions already taken (usually outside parliament), while the opposition parties use the debating time to attack the government's proposals (Landwehr and Holzinger 2010) . Any change in preferences among the participants of parliamentary debate is unlikely. Therefore, the deliberative qualities of the system are poor, which has also been confirmed by the empirical examination of particular debates. The parliaments of Great Britain and Germany, as examples of the institutional system, showed the poorest quality discourse in legislature compared to the presidential system (the US) and consensus democracy (Switzerland) (for more details see Steiner et al. 2004) . Parliamentary systems (excluding consensus ones) are generally not a benign place for high quality discourse in the legislature (Bächtinger et al. 2008) .
Presidential systems appear to represent a more favourable institutional environment for deliberation in the legislature. The executive is not directly dependent on legislative confidence its stability is not threatened by potential cross-party cooperation, which reduces the pressure on party discipline. As the government-opposition divide is not as strong as in parliamentary systems, legislators may be more sensitive to the arguments, which could contribute to the creation of a deliberating space. The problem is that this system does not eliminate party competition; the parties compete with each other for control of the government, and legislators realize that their success is bound to the parties (Steiner et al. 2004) . We can expect slightly higher deliberative qualities than in the parliamentary system, but the difference seems to be insignificant. These assumptions have also been confirmed by the empirical findings of Steiner et al. They observed a higher level of respect in discussion, but lower levels of justification and constructive politics compared to the parliamentary systems (Steiner et al. 2004, 122-125) . In general, however, empirical studies have confirmed that the deliberative quality in presidential systems does not significantly differ from that in parliamentary systems. Though it is difficult to draw broader generalisations from these findings given the small number of debates analysed, we can say that in itself the institutional form of a presidential system is not able to reduce political competition in parliament and thus create a more favourable environment for deliberation. Here again, the crucial role of political competition has been confirmed.
In terms of the opportunities for deliberation, a presidential system combined with singlemandate electoral districts for the members of parliament with the absence (or minimal role) of the parties seems to be very interesting 10 . In this setting, individual MPs would compete with each other neither directly nor indirectly as party members. This could prevent the transfer of political competition into parliament and create a favourable environment for deliberation. At first glance it may seem that the appropriate combination of conditions and institutions may make it possible to escape the influence of political competition in parliament. In my opinion, this is an illusion because even in this case political competition will significantly determine legislators' behaviour in parliaments. Legislators will compete with each other within individual electoral districts, motivated by the effort to pursue particular and local interests. This situation prevents the actors from focusing on the common good, which is not the sum of individual interests. At the same time it contributes to a strategic approach-attempts at self-assertion are on the basis of the strength of the votes, not the arguments. Although at first glance this institutional setting seems to be appropriate, it cannot prevent the application of elements of competitive democracy and we cannot expect the deliberative quality of discourse to be considerably higher than in presidential or parliamentary systems where parties have a significant role.
In this case it is rather a theoretical conception with limited potential for application under real conditions. Regardless of the fact that in much of the literature on legislatures similar conceptions are opposed to the prominence of strong parties as a normative ideal, all democratic legislatures are organised along party lines and parties control the activity of legislative organisations (Carey 2009 ). The idea of a parliament without the long-term presence of the parties is in fact unrealistic and would require special structural and cultural characteristics in society. Moreover, the need to permanently build ad-hoc majorities in order to obtain the support of a large number of individual actors would result in high transaction costs for decision-making. However, this example is very useful because it shows more clearly that the major obstacle to deliberation in the parliaments is the existence of political competition, not the parties themselves.
As I have already indicated, the most conducive institutional setting in terms of discourse quality in parliaments seems to be the institutional model of consensus democracy. This well-known model by Lijphart, represents a counterpoint to majoritarian democracy (particularly of the Westminster type) with strong party competition. Consensus democracy is characterised by a set of institutional mechanisms 11 , out of which two are particularly 10 Theoretically we could consider such a configuration in the case of a parliamentary system, but an atomised parliament without political parties cannot provide the government with consistent support. Such a system is predisposed to serious instability; hence, it cannot represent a viable alternative worth considering (like the necessity of party cohesion and discipline for the functioning of a parliamentary system (Sartori 2001, 190-195) . 11 They include the executive-legislative balance of power, executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, a multiparty system, proportional representation, a corporatist interest groups system, federal and decentralised government, strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, strong judicial review and central bank independence (see Lijphart 1999). important in promoting deliberation: the existence of grand coalitions and institutional veto points (Steiner et al. 2001; , Bächtinger et al. 2008 . The existence of grand coalitions should be conducive to deliberation for several reasons. Grand coalitions generate more cooperative interaction orientations among political actors (Scharpf 1997) , which makes possible the logic of joint decision-making, where argumentative rationality might be necessary for problem-solving (Bächtinger et al. 2008; Steiner et al. 2004) . Moreover, to maintain the stability of the coalition and to ensure a successful government record, actors need to adopt a cooperative attitude vis-à-vis their coalition partners, comprising a willingness to discuss differences in a constructive and respectful way. Reduced competition makes it more likely that parties will engage in open discourse and will deliberate policies (Steiner et al. 2004, 80) . Institutional veto points strengthen the need for joint decisionmaking and force a larger number of actors into the decision-making process, which could further increase the quality of deliberation.
These ideas have been also confirmed by empirical studies of parliamentary debates. The consensus-competition dimension of democracy has an impact on the quality of parliamentary discourse and consensus settings are strongly conducive to the realization of deliberative ideals (Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtinger et al. 2008) .
The results provide evidence of the influence of institutions on the form and quality of deliberation in the parliament, which could create relatively simple opportunities for increasing the level of deliberation in parliaments. Yet, in my opinion, they do not represent sufficient reason to consider a consensus democracy (or its selected institutions) to be more valuable.
First of all, the improvement in the democratic quality of parliamentary debates in a consensus system seems to be partial and extremely low. This is evident in the nature of the increase in respect toward other actors, which does not translate into a more constructive political approach. Or, to put it differently, positional politics is the norm in both consensus and competitive systems (Steiner et al. 2004) . Though the value of higher respect is statistically relevant, it still represents a very small shift in deliberative quality. One example is the finding of Bächtinger et al (2008) who talk about the respect difference between Switzerland (grand coalition) and Germany (government-opposition setting) with the mean effect of 0.4 point on a scale ranging from 0-9 12 . This means that the influence of consensual institutions translates into an increase in discourse quality. This influence, however, is limited mainly to the area of respect and is rather small, which indicates the persistence of a dominant logic of political competition in the system. Second, consensual institutions have a negative impact on the crucial democratic values of political equality and responsiveness. In principle, grand coalitions and institutional veto points hinder super-majority voting in parliament and create the need to obtain more support, which means that they represent certain forms of super-majority mechanisms. In the case of parliamentary decision-making, however, political equality implies a simple majority rule (McGann 2006) . On the one hand super-majority mechanisms require broader consent and cooperation than a simple majority and on the other hand they involve the preference 12 Steiner et al. (2004) found similar levels of change on the same scale. of certain alternatives (or groups of voters) over others, the status quo in particular. This means the principle of political equality is breached. We must also bear in mind that apart from the favourable effects on deliberation, the reduction in political competition also results in a decrease in responsiveness. It is questionable at least whether it is possible to justify a small increase in deliberative quality at the expense of violating political equality and the responsiveness of the democratic system.
Of course, these objections do not mean the total rejection of a consensus model of democracy. In certain situations (in particular in the case of deeply divided societies) it offers an acceptable and meaningful alternative to democratic decision-making, where the problems concerning political equality and responsiveness are justifiable. On the other hand, it can be considered as an appropriate and applicable institutional way of easily achieving a higher deliberative quality and democratic legitimacy of a political system. The potential efforts made to introduce the elements of consensus democracy in order to achieve higher deliberative qualities of the parliament or broader political decision-making seem to be irrelevant.
In general it appeared that the deliberative quality of parliaments is not very high. The empirical studies confirmed that institutional rules may contribute to a higher deliberative quality of the parliament, but only to a small extent, which means that the normative value of such a shift is questionable.
Conclusion
Deliberative democracy offers a new, attractive conception of democratic quality and legitimacy, which seem to be a useful addition to democracy based on political competition. Despite a number of theoretical and practical problems with the two models, together they are able to better encompass the complexity of expectations and objectives of democracy. In this sense, parliaments appear to be exceptionally appropriate institutions that could offer considerable opportunities for the application of deliberative elements together with political competition. However, a more detailed theoretical analysis clearly shows that the combination of the two conceptions of democracy within a single institution is rather problematic and there is only a marginal chance of reaching the desired values and benefits of the two conceptions at once.
Where parliament is concerned, party competition (often strengthened by a governmentopposition setting) creates a deeply unfavourable environment for increasing the deliberative qualities. The polarization of relationships among the actors that results in a non-constructive form of debate is not a pathological feature, but a natural consequence of competitive democracy. However, parliaments could contain more significant deliberative content and institutional changes appear to be the easiest and most accessible way of achieving this. It has proved true that institutionally it is possible to increase the deliberative qualities of parliaments, particularly by means of mechanisms based on the consensus model of democracy, which contribute to an increase in the level of deliberation through reducing party competition and majority decision-making. It appears, however, that the increased deliberative quality of parliament may result in the reduction of other important democratic qualities: responsiveness to voters (due to the reduction in political competition) and the value of political equality. The final effect of increased deliberative qualities is relatively small and far removed from the ideal of deliberative democracy.
Introducing deliberative elements into parliament as an institution based on political competition does not seem to be very successful nor beneficial, hence we should be very careful in implementing institutional changes or innovations which refer to or try to achieve deliberative democracy and its values. These demonstrably few opportunities for introducing deliberation into parliaments (and institutions established in political competition) provide the proponents of deliberative democracy with three ways of harmonising it with parliaments.
The first could be an attempt to replace political competition as a mechanism for establishing representative institutions. As I have tried to show, political competition hinders more significant implementation of deliberation in the parliament. The replacement of political competition with a different democratically legitimate mechanism for choosing representatives (e.g. random choice) could significantly alter the adverse conditions for deliberation. This possibility seems reasonable, but it requires a substantial and radical change to the political system including the wider public for deliberative democracy and recognition of its democratic legitimacy. It is safe to say, however, that in the near future the fulfilment of these conditions is unrealistic.
The second is to change perceptions on deliberation as an institutionally defined process. It may also be perceived as a broader systemic characteristic of decision-making than can be made gradually step by step and at different levels. An example of this approach is a study by R. Goodin (2008) which points out the possibilities for "distributed deliberation" with different agents playing different deliberative roles. He argues that we cannot expect deliberative virtues to be continuously and simultaneously present in every step of the decision-making process of representative democracy, but that it is realistic to expect different deliberative virtues to be on display sequentially, over the course of deliberation. He agrees that the deliberative qualities of parliamentary debate are rather low, but that parliamentary debate contains mainly rational justifications for individual arguments. By combining this value with values at other levels of the decision-making process (party caucus, election campaigns, postelection bargaining) we can approximate the ideal of deliberative democracy. Within this approach the low level of deliberation in parliament is not worrying and does not require urgent action for improvement. A similar argument can be found in a study by S. Rummens (2011) who focuses on the importance of traditional representative institutions based on political competition for the quality and functioning of deliberative democracy. The representative system with clear responsibility for decisions and the presence of an opposition is suitable for successfully fulfilling the total deliberative quality of the system despite the fact that the representative forum itself is not deliberative in nature. 13 The debate between representatives is important for making the political processes available to the general public, which is a major precondition for large-scale deliberation (Rummens 2011) . In this case, the insufficient deliberative quality of parliament does not represent a problem for the implementation of deliberative democracy.
The third approach is to continue searching for other institutional (or other) ways of increasing the deliberative qualities of parliaments. Due to the tension between political competition and deliberation it is necessary to allow limited opportunities, however, the attempt need not be fruitless. The Swiss example of the use of direct democracy seems to be the most conducive to the development of deliberation in parliaments. By introducing uncertainty into the legislative process, direct democracy generally provides incentives to find common solutions among the parties involved in complying with public expectations. Unlike other institutional veto points in consensus systems, direct democracy does not lead to a decrease in responsiveness, rather the contrary.
The aforementioned possible directions for deliberative democracy clearly show that the issue of how to connect it with parliament is nowhere near being solved. To answer the question as to which of the three ways will be finally implemented requires more detailed theoretical and comparative empirical research.
